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1964] RECENT DECISIONS 1089 
TORTS-JOINT ToRT-FEASoRS-RELEASE OF ONE NoT RELEASE OF 
ALL-Plaintiff, a woman who had been struck by a taxicab, underwent 
treatment by defendant-physician. After eight months under defendant's 
care, she accepted his assurances that she would fully recover, and 
executed a general release in favor of the taxi driver. Plaintiff subsequently 
discovered, however, that the defendant had been negligent in his treat-
ment of her both before and after the execution of the release. In a 
malpractice action before the Supreme Court of New York judgment was 
entered in favor of the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Appellate 
Division dismissed the original complaint, holding that the general release 
discharging the original wrongdoer also discharged the physician. On 
appeal, held, reversed and judgment reinstated, three judges dissenting. 
The release of one tort-feasor does not discharge another tort-feasor unless 
it is so intended or the consideration given constitutes full satisfaction. 
Derby v. Prewitt, 12 N.Y.2d 100, 236 N.Y.S.2d 953, 187 N.E.2d 556 (1963). 
At common law the term joint "tort-feasors" was deemed to include not 
only those multiple tort-feasors who act in concert but also those who act 
independently but concurrently and those who act independently but 
successively.1 The traditional rule has been that a release of any such 
joint tort-feasor releases all,2 and despite the fact that writers have 
frequently criticized the application of this rule to the two kinds of 
independent joint tort-feasors,3 it has nevertheless been upheld in most 
states.4 This rule governing the release of the joint tort-feasor was evolved 
1 See PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955). 
2 E.g., Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956) (successive tort•feasors); 
Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. Ill, ll7, 166 A.2d 892, 895 (1961) (successive tort-feasors); 
Shortt v. Hudson Supply &: Equip. Co., 191 Va. l!06, 60 S.E.2d 900 (1950) (concurrent 
tort-feasors); Abb v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28 Wash. 428, 68 Pac. 954 (1902) (concurrent 
tort-feasors), 
3 COOLEY, TORTS § 80 (19l!O); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 9l!l!-l!5 (1951); l HARPER &: 
JAMES, TOR.TS 711-12 (1956); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 46, at 244-45; Prosser, 
Joint Torts and Several Liabilities, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413 (19l!7); Wigmore, Release to 
One Joint Tort-Feasor, 17 ILL. L. REv. 563 (1923). 
4 Shapiro v. Embassy Dairy, Inc., ll2 F. Supp. 696 (D.N.C. 1953); see PROSSER, 
op. cit. supra note 1, § 46. 
1090 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
to solve the problem raised by the commission of concerted wrongs where 
the effects of the separate acts could not be distinguished.15 In justification 
for extending the doctrine to independent tort-feasors, it was said that 
the original wrongdoer was responsible for the proximate, foreseeable 
consequences of his negligent acts, including the aggravation of such 
injuries by. a negligent physician.6 The courts reasoned that the wrongs of 
independent tort-feasors coalesced into one cause of action,7 and therefore 
the release of all claims and causes of action as to the original wrongdoer 
necessarily discharged any other wrongdoers.8 It was thought that to hold 
otherwise would allow the injured party to recover twice for a single cause 
of action.9 
Notwithstanding these purported justifications, the inelastic common-
law rule seems unjust where there is an intention to release only one 
tort-feasor, as in the principal case, or where the release does not provide 
the injured party with adequate compensation. Under the traditional rule 
a release is presumptively full satisfaction,10 and the actual compensable 
needs of the plaintiff are consequently disregarded. A presumption of full 
satisfaction seems warranted only if there is a single indivisible injury, 
and when the acts are independent the injuries are not necessarily indivisi-
ble. It would probably be more reasonable in such circumstances to 
presume that the release of one wrongdoer merely represents the best 
obtainable compromise, rather than to deem it full compensation as a 
matter of law. Furthermore, the fear of double satisfaction is unrealistic, 
since any compensation received from one tort-feasor, by release or other-
wise, is deducted from the actual damages recovered from the other tort-
feasor.11 
5 See generally Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liabilities, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 399 
(1939); Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liabilities, supra note 3. 
6 Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 128, 137 P.2d 1017, 1018 (1943); Wells v. Gould, 
131 Me. 192, 194, 160 Atl. 30 (1932); Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 
Minn. 418, 422, 92 N.W.2d 96, 99 (1958); Martin v. Cunningham, 93 Wash. 517, 518, 
161 Pac. 355, 356 (1916). See also REsrATEMENT, TORTS §§ 457, 879 (1934). 
7 Wells v. Gould, supra note 6, at 194, 160 Atl. at 30; Milks v. Mdver, 264 N.Y. 
267, 269, 190 N.E. 487, 488 (1934). 
8 Sams v. Curfman, 111 Colo. 124, 137 P.2d 1017 (1943); Martin v. Cunningham, 93 
Wash. 517, 161 Pac. 355 (1916). Contra, Dickow v. Cookinham, 123 Cal. App. 2d 81, 89, 
266 P .2d 63, 69 (1954). 
9 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 42, 298 P.2d 957, 959 (1956); Sams v. Curfman, 111 
Colo. 124, 128, 137 P.2d 1017, 1018 (1943); Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587, 5!11, 
151 S.E. 114, 116 (1929); McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176, 182, 93 N.W. 243, 245 (1903). 
10 See O'Shea v. New York C. &: St. L.R.R., 105 Fed. 559, 561 (7th Cir. 1901); Hawber 
v. Raley, 92 Cal. App. 701, 705, 268 Pac. 943, 944 (1928); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note l, 
§ 46 at 243. Authorities have used blanket statements, such as that a "release is considered 
a satisfaction in law, and equivalent to a satisfaction in fact" (Brown v. Marsh, 7 Vt. 
320, 327 (1835)), or that a release is "presumptively in full satisfaction" (Burke v. Burnham, 
97 N.H. 203, 210, 84 A.2d 918, 924 (1952)). 
11 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 42, 298 P.2d 957, 959 (1956); Trieschman v. Eaton, 
224 Md. 111, 119-20, 166 A.2d 892, 896-97 (1961); see PROSSER, op. cit. supra note l, § 46 
at 244. 
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For many years a growing minority of courts12 has refused to apply 
the common-law rule to independent tort-feasors. These courts have taken 
at least four different approaches. Some inquire initially whether the 
wrongdoers acted in concert; if the acts were independent, two distinct 
causes of action are found to exist, the release of one having no effect upon 
the other.18 Others give effect to express reservations of right to sue con-
tained in the release.14 Another group of courts circumvents the common-
law rule by interpreting a release as a covenant not to sue; the cause of 
action is not extinguished and the plaintiff may pursue other tort-feasors 
until he is fully compensated.15 The most frequently used alternative to 
the traditional release doctrine is the theory, applied in the principal case, 
that the release of one wrongdoer does not discharge a subsequent 
wrongdoer unless the parties to the release so intended or the injured party 
has in fact received full compensation.16 A frequent objection to this 
approach is that the admission of evidence of intent or actual damage 
violates the parol evidence rule.17 This criticism, however, is unwarranted, 
12 In addition to judicial innovation, there has been significant legislative activity in 
this area. The original UNIFORM CONTRIBUTIONS AMONG JOINT TORT·FEASORS Acr (1939), 
as well as the 1955 Revision, states that a release of one joint tort-feasor does not discharge 
any other tort-feasor unless the instrument so provides. Ten states have adopted, 
unmodified, the act or its revision: ARK. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1962); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1953); HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 246-10 to -16 (1955); Mo. ANN. 
CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1962); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -1-18 (1953); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -38-04 (Supp. 1957); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2080-89 (1951); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to -6-11 (1956 & 
Supp. 1963); S.D. CODE §§ 33.04A01-.04A10 (1960). The MODEL :JOINT OBLIGATIONS 
Acr (1925) permits express reservations of right to sue and treats a release containing 
such a reservation as a covenant not to sue. Furthermore, the act provides that a judgment 
against one obligor does not discharge a co-obligor who was not a party to the action. 
Four states have adopted the act: NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 101-010 to -090 (1961); N.Y. DEBT 
& CRED. LAw § 231-04 (1945); UTAH CooE ANN. §§ 15-4-1 to -4-7 (1953); WIS. STAT. 
§§ 113.01-.10 (1957). Other state laws affecting the common law of release are: Au.. CoDE 
tit. 7, § 381 (1958) (intent of parties to be controlling); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2203 (1952) 
(common-law rule not to apply if release expressly reserves right to sue others); MxcH. 
STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925 (1962) (abolishing the release rule); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 
(1953) (abolishing the release rule); MONT. REv. CooES ANN. § 13.702 (1955) (intent of the 
parties to be controlling); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 5481 (1961) (abolishing the release rule). 
18 Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo. 217, 228, 256 S.W. 239, 241 (1923) (original wrongdoer 
and negligent physician were same person); Staehlin v. Hochdoerfer, 235 S.W. 1060, 1062 
(Mo. 1921); Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 265-66, 292 Pac. 577, 579-80 (1930); see Ash v. 
Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944). 
14 Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 356-57, 126 N.E. 300, 302 (1919); 
Black v. Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 267, 292 Pac. 577, 580 (1930); see Connelly v. United States 
Steel Co., 161 Ohio St. 448, 452, 119 N.E.2d 843, 846 (1954). Contra, McBride v. Scott, 132 
Mich. 176, 93 N.W. 243 (1903). 
111 Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 160 P.2d 783 (1945); Dwy v. Connecticut 
Co., 89 Conn. 74, 92 Atl. 883 (1915); Holland v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 208 N.C. 289, 
180 S.E. 592 (1935). 
16 E.g., Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. 2d 654, 150 P .2d 876 (1944); Couillard v. Charles T. 
Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958); Staehlin v. Hochdoerfcr, 235 S.W. 
1060 (Mo. 1921); Hansen v. Collett, 380 P.2d 301 (Nev. 1963); Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 
150, 106 Atl. 602 (1919); Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958). 
17 Principal case at 561 (dissenting opinion); 36 TEXAs L. REv. 55, 61 (1957); sec 
Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W .2d 96 (1958). 
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for it is well settled that a stranger to a release has no standing to raise the 
parol evidence rule.18 Since the second tort-feasor is neither a party to, nor 
a third-party beneficiary of, the release, he is consequently a stranger to it 
and has no standing to raise the parol evidence rule.19 Without reference 
to the fact that the second tort-feasor lacks standing, some courts have 
purported to avoid the parol evidence rule by relying on the exception for 
mutual mistake.20 Despite the fact that in most cases the release clearly 
shows that the parties intended to discharge the releasee from liability for 
both known and unknown injuries,21 these courts assume there is a mutual 
mistake simply because unknown injuries later develop.22 The reliance of 
these courts on the mutual mistake exception seems ill-placed;23 all that is 
clear is that these courts do refuse to apply the common-law rule, their 
justification for doing so remaining obscure. 
It cannot be seriously denied that the results of the common-law 
doctrine are usually unjust when applied to independent tort-feasors. 
An injured party seeking to avoid litigation might be deterred from enter-
ing into a settlement with one tort-feasor because releasing one would bar 
his claim against the other. Moreover, to hold that the release of one tort-
feasor always releases all other tort-feasors, regardless of the compensation 
actually received, ignores the basic purpose of tort recovery-to make the 
injured party whole. 
18 E.g., Dickow v. Cookinham, 123 Cal. App. 2d 81, 88, 266 P.2d 63, 69 (1954): 
Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., supra note 17, at 424-28, 92 N.W.2d at 101; 
Fitzgerald v. Union Stock Yards Co., 89 Neb. 393, 402, 131 N.W. 612, 615 (1911); Safety 
Cab Co. v. Fair, 181 Okla. 264, 266, 74 P.2d 607, 609 (1937). Contra, Muse v. DeVito, 
243 Mass. 384, 137 N.E. 730 (1923). See also 4 CoRBIN, op. cit. supra, note 14, § 934; 4 
WILLISTON, GoNTRAcrs § 647 (rev. ed. 1936). Also, parol evidence is admissible to show 
that a release absolute in form was actually intended as a covenant not to sue. See 4 
CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 934. 
10 Although application of the common-law rule would cause a release of one tort-
feasor to have a direct effect upon a second tort-feasor, this fact cannot be used to show 
that the second has standing to assert the parol evidence rule when the court has 
previously chosen to reject the common-law rule. 
20 E.g., Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96 
(1958). "[I]f the circumstances are such that despite the wording of the release, the 
parties cannot be said to have contracted with reference to unknown injuries, and a 
material unknown injury subsequently develops, mutual mistake exists and parol evidence 
may be introduced to show it." Larson v. Sventek, 211 Minn. 385, 388, 1 N.W.2d 608, 
610 (1941). 
21 A typical release provision provides that the releasor discharges "all actions, causes 
of actions, claims and demands, damages and costs, accruing and to accrue to me on 
account of any and all known by me and unknown injury, loss and damage whatsoever, 
directly or indirectly sustained by me •••. " 11 AM. JuR. Legal Forms § 11:1023 (1955). 
See also id. § 11:1023.1 (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
22 Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W.2d 96. To use 
the mutual mistake e.xception to the parol evidence rule, the language of the instrument 
must mean different things to the parties, and it is therefore questionable whether 
these courts can really find a mutual mistake where the terms of the release are clearly 
stated. See note 21 supra. 
23 The parol evidence rule cannot be avoided by relying on the exception for 
.ambiguity, because the instrument usually makes it clear that the parties intend to 
release as to both known and unknown injuries. See note 21 supra. 
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The principal case is clearly in line with the modem trend away from 
strict application of the common-law rule regarding release of joint tort-
feasors.24 Milks v. Mclver,25 the leading New York decision on this problem 
prior to the principal case, upheld the common-law rule on substantially 
the same facts. To avoid expressly overruling Milks, however, the court 
in the principal case distinguished Milks on the ground that the plaintiff 
there was aware of the physician's malpractice when the release was 
executed. Thus, according to the court in the principal case, the considera-
tion received in exchange for the release was presumed to be in complete 
satisfaction for all injuries.26 A close reading of Milks, however, reveals 
that the ground of decision was that there was but one cause of action,27 
and thus there was no inquiry into the adequacy of the consideration or 
the intent of the parties. The court in the principal case, however, clearly 
rejected the argument that there is but one cause of action;28 furthermore, 
the intent of the parties and the adequacy, of the compensation received 
were regarded as factual considerations of considerable importance.29 In 
addition, the court cited with approval cases in which plaintiffs were fully 
aware of the subsequent malpractice before the releases were executed in 
favor of the original tort-feasors.30 It appears that, despite its reluctance 
to overrule Milks, the court of appeals has adopted a mode of analysis 
wholly inconsistent with the rationale of the older decision. In the 
principal case the court of appeals did not discuss the problem of con-
current but independent tort-feasors, and further did not expressly reject 
the common-law rule as to successive but independent tort-feasors. Never-
theless, the tenor and approach of the principal case strongly suggest that 
Milks is no longer law in New York, and that release of one independent 
tort-feasor will never automatically release another. 
Karen M. Swift 
24 E.g., Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300 (1919), overrul-
ing Ellis v. Bitzer, 2 Ohio 89 (1825); Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 
418, 92 N.W.2d 96 (1958), overruling Smith v. Mann, 184 Minn. 485, 239 N.W. 223 
(1931); Daily v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958), overruling Adam v. DeYoe, 
II N.J. Misc. 319, 166 Atl. 485 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 67 
N.W.2d 860 (1955), overruling Hooyman v. Reeve, 168 Wis. 420, 170 N.W. 282 (1919) and 
Retelle v. Sullivan, 191 Wis. 576, 2II N.W. 756 (1927). 
25 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934). In this case plaintiff was struck by a truck and 
was treated for injuries by defendant-physician. After her discharge from the hospital 
her guardian ad litem executed a release of all claims against the owner and operator 
of the truck in consideration of $3,384. The subsequent complaint against the physician 
for damages was dismissed on the grounds that there was but one cause of action and 
the release against the original wrongdoers discharged the physician. 
26 Principal case at 560. 
27 Milks v. Mciver, 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N.E. 487 (1934). 
28 Principal case at 558-59. 
20 Id. at 559·60. 
30 Id. at 560, citing Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 
N.W.2d 96 (1958); Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 Atl. 602 (1919); Daily v. Somberg, 
28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958). 
